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THE PROSPECTS OF COOPERATION 
IN A BIPOLAR WORLD 
HAROLD . LASSWELL* 
S WORLD politics freezes into a bipolar mold, policies in every 
sphere of human activity are affected by calculations of the 
relative strength of America and Russia. A good crop in West- 
ern Germany is chiefly evaluated, not in economic or humanitarian terms, 
but according to its effect upon Soviet-American power. The question 
whether Italy is to receive economic assistance is entangled with esti- 
mates of how the economic recuperation of the Italian peoples will 
affect the spread of communism. Whether Koreans or Chinese are to 
have medical aid becomes subordinated to the Russo-American balance 
of power in Asia. Every expansion of population, every decline in the 
death rate, every upswing in production, every drop or rise in the stand- 
ard of living, every amelioration in the respect position of the colored 
peoples, every advance in scientific knowledge, every radio broadcast, 
every movement of students or traders or tourists or displaced persons 
across frontier lines, every addition to transportation facilities (by air, 
sea, or land), every movement of raw materials, foodstuffs, semi-processed 
products, machine tools or consumer goods: In a word every social change 
is promptly weighed in the scale pans of power and responded to accord- 
ingly. 
The prospects of cooperation depend upon whether the demands, ex- 
pectations, and identifications of Russians and Americans can be modi- 
fied to include cooperation.' 
It is no exaggeration to say that World War I was a traumatic shock to 
the West, mainly because it happened at all. Business civilization had a 
dream of its own, the legend of a peaceful, prosperous, and fraternal fu- 
ture. It was the dream told round the world by Cobden, who spoke of the 
perfectibility of man as the peoples of the earth learned to buy and sell 
freely in One Big Market.2 
The businessman's utopia has not been unchallenged; and the princi- 
* Professor of Law, Yale Law School. 
All perspectives are conveniently divisible into demands, which are preferences and 
volitions, expectations, which are assumptions about past-present-future, and identifications, 
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World Politics and Personal Insecurity (I935). 
2 See Hobson, Richard Cobden, the International Man (I9I9). 
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pal challenger was Marx, who though at one with Cobden in prophesy- 
ing the imminent progress of mankind, foretold the realization of freedom 
by catastrophe, not evolution. The Marxist forecast gained in influence 
as it grew in plausibility: Had it not predicted the growth of monopoly? 
the recurring crises of boom and bust? the rise of a class-conscious move- 
ment of protest demanding radical means of ushering in the free man's 
commonwealth? 
The trauma of 1914 was in the true sense of the word a psychic shock, 
since it was shocking precisely because it fulfilled expectations largely 
denied or suppressed.3 The ideology of the ruling elements of the West 
offered no coherent explanation of big-scale war or big-scale monopoly. 
And yet a counter-ideology had been shouted from the soapboxes and 
even the parliaments of Europe for decades, demanding at least a rational 
answer. 
Today, after a succession of shattering blows, and in the midst of a 
crystallizing bipolar pattern of global politics, pessimism about coopera- 
tion is as universal as the optimism of former decades. The skeleton of 
war can no longer be kept in the closet; it has the run of the press. The 
fact of conflict is no longer glossed over by the amenities of diplomatic 
doubletalk. (The outspokenness of Soviet diplomats has raised public 
vituperation to a diplomatic folkway.) 
And so we ask: Is the pessimism of today as overdone as the optimism 
of yesterday? Can there be cooperation in a bipolarizing world? 
A DEVELOPMENTAL CONSTRUCT OF THE FUTURE 
Let us begin by imagining the future if cooperation wins. By requiring 
ourselves to think through this possibility, we make it necessary to con- 
sider the factors affecting war, not "in general," but in the context of 
events in which we live. (It is assumed in this discussion that we approve 
of policies that aim to extract as much safety, prosperity, and decency as 
possible from the historical circumstances in which we are caught.) We 
begin with events since the bomb, and postulate four periods: Period I. 
Weapon supremacy of the U.S. Period II. Reports of the U.S.S.R. weapon 
parity become more credible. Period III. Weapon Parity Attained. Period 
IV. The Turning Point. 
It is apparent that we are passing out of the first into the second period, 
A.B. During phase one, which we are completing, a leading characteris- 
tic was universal recognition that the U.S. had weapon superiority in the 
newest instruments of warfare. 
3 See Freud, Inhibition, Symptom and Anxiety (1927). 
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Starting first with the Russian elite, their behavior during the first 
period was intelligible if we postulate the following structure of expecta- 
tions on their part: The U.S. is unlikely to use the bomb in the immediate 
future because of several factors: Residual enthusiasm among the Ameri- 
can people for the heroic resistance of Russia to Nazi aggression; over- 
whelming popular demand for the return and demobilization of most of 
the armed forces; enthusiasm to "get the government out of business"; 
continuing hatred of the Germans; a temporary stabilization of capital- 
ism during the early years of reconstruction; and the avoiding of mass 
crises of unemployment. An effective system of international inspection 
would authoritatively confirm rumors of our inner weaknesses (both 
material and psychological), and increase the likelihood that the ruling 
elements in the U.S. would take the initiative in attacking the Soviet 
Union (seeking to liquidate the center of world revolutionary menace to 
the bourgeois world). By protracted negotiation it will be possible to pre- 
vent the issue of effective control from coming to a head. 
The behavior of the U.S. elite during the same period is intelligible if 
we postulate the following expectations on their part: Even if desirable, 
the American people are unwilling to wage a preventive war against Rus- 
sia; there is a possibility (however slight) that a basis for effective atomic 
control can be laid by negotiation (even apart from a general settlement 
of Russo-American relations); if the negotiations do in fact fail, the unity 
of our people will be increased in favor of a policy which "contains" Rus- 
sia in a military sense, while fostering the long range probability of peace 
by aiding the recovery and prosperity of the accessible peoples of the 
globe. 
Today we are entering a second phase whose outstanding expectation 
can be summed up in this way: Reports of weapon parity with the U.S. 
on the part of the Soviet Union will be treated as more and more credible. 
If this second phase is navigated without World War III, third period 
expectations will be: The U.S. and the U.S.S.R. have weapon parity. 
THE PROSPECTS OF A TURNING POINT 
If peaceful cooperation is to succeed in the long run, there will be a 
fourth period in which the expectation of war begins to diminish, and the 
meagre trickle of pacific contact between the two polar camps will swell 
into an enlarging stream, inaugurating a new era of peaceful association 
in which the world community makes direct progress toward a more per- 
fect community of free men. 
In constructing a speculative model of the fourth period, we begin by 
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considering two subdivisions, one before and one after the turning point. 
The first subphase can be characterized in terms of dominant expecta- 
tions: 
I) "Push-button" war may begin any time. This implies that world 
politics is crystallized in two sharply delimited groups of states that watch 
each other in full awareness of the possibility that war may begin at any 
moment. 
2) If the opponent makes a sudden, unprevented attack, he can inflict 
severe damage. Weapon parity, such as we assume for the two opposing 
camps, does not imply formal equality of destructive potential. We postu- 
late no more than the recognition of the existence of capacity to impose 
severe damage. 
3) If the opponent makes an attack, severe damage will be inflicted on 
him. Since potential antagonists will have one another under continual 
surveillance, a sneak attack, even if undetected, is not likely to deliver 
a knockout blow, but rather to set off a counterblow mechanism. 
4) If the opponent initiates an attack, it may be possible to anticipate 
him by launching a preventive attack. This takes into account the pos- 
sibility that one's system of surveillance can be so efficient that the enemy 
can be hit before he consummates an intended assault. 
5) If one decides to initiate an attack upon the opponent (in the hope 
of putting an end to the high level of continuing tension), the opponent 
may initiate a preventive attack instantly, thanks to his system of sur- 
veillance; even if he delays, he can (as assumed above) inflict severe dam- 
age. This discounts the possibility of escaping the enemy's surveillance 
sufficiently to deliver a surprise knockout blow. 
6) The elite of the opposing power expects to retain its ascendancy at 
home without using war as a means of diverting revolutionary tension 
against a foreign enemy; the elite is also aware that the damage resulting 
from war would be grave enough to endanger the retention of power, as 
well as the enjoyment of other values. To postulate that elites are not 
threatened at home at this stage means that they have solved the problem 
of adjusting their people to the way of life called for under garrison condi- 
tions. Everyone has become accustomed to live with the cloud of war on 
the horizon, and to justify special demands in the language of strategic 
advantage. Institutions have been adapted to the maintenance of high 
levels of productive employment, and to the prevention of crises of mass 
discontent from whatever cause. Further, it is postulated that the ruling 
elements of the two garrisons recognize that war can mean, not one sur- 
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viving and triumphant Rome, but two Carthages.4 If Russia and America 
knock each other out (or inflict shattering reductions of power upon each 
other) the power vacuum will be gradually occupied by the surviving per- 
ipheral powers (unless, of course, all life is annihilated). 
7) The elite of the opposing power can prevent unauthorized acts of 
war. This postulate refers to the possibility of detecting and restraining 
those paranoid persons or cliques who may privately initiate acts of ag- 
gression. 
8) Our elite can prevent unauthorized acts of war. This refers to cir- 
cumstances which correspond to seven (just above). Given the foregoing 
structure of expectation, the dominant policy demand will be, "Don't 
make war now" (since war would be expected to leave the elites worse off 
than no-war). 
We now come to the turning point itself. The structure of expectation 
can be described in the following terms: 
I) The elites of the two garrison camps recognize the high cost of pre- 
paring for a war that, if it comes, will endanger their power. Instead of 
diverting human resources into armament, it will be obvious that the 
standard of living and the level of scientific knowledge, for instance, can 
be improved. 
2) The elites of the two garrisons recognize that neither one depends 
upon war or the threat of war to retain power at home. According to Marx- 
ist doctrine war is inevitable because of the internal instability of capital- 
ism, and the desire to divert explosive insecurities against the external 
enemy. We postulate that the non-Russian world learns how to avoid 
crises of mass unemployment, and in this way undermines the doctrinaire 
expectation just described. 
3) Both elites can gain by agreeing to limit and reduce arms, and by 
inaugurating modes of administrative control that maintain mutual con- 
fidence. It is postulated that both elites achieve enough confidence in 
their own strength to permit disclosure. 
FURTHER DETAIL ON THE SECOND AND THIRD PERIODS 
The foregoing sketch of the "turning point" enables us to fill in the gap 
between the present and the fourth period (on the assumption that war is 
avoided throughout). 
IN THE UNITED STATES 
As estimates of Russia's expanding weapon strength become more 
credible, the America-centered world grows less and less secure. Military 
4 Lasswell, The Interrelations of World Organization and Society, 55 Yale L.J. 889, 897 
(1946). 
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considerations are given increasing weight in calculations of official and 
private policy. Hence the resources of the nation are allocated in ways 
that are assumed to improve national security. 
This involves an accelerated tempo of governmentalization. In part 
this comes about because of the vast expenditures which are deemed es- 
sential for the military establishments. Partly, too, the government will 
be turned to for funds as private investors, appalled by the high probabil- 
ity of war, fail to provide the funds needed to maintain high levels of pro- 
ductive employment (and it is generally recognized that the nation would 
collapse politically if it permitted mass unemployment). The expansion 
of government is also fostered by the demand to check on the loyalty of 
everyone in public life, and to an increasing extent, in any sphere of ac- 
tivity whatever. Scrutiny by the police of government employees will be 
broadened to include all who receive contracts and subcontracts from 
public funds, and since an ever increasing percentage of American indus- 
try, education, and research will depend upon government money, 
police surveillance will become a regular feature of American life, and de- 
nunciations will become a more common means of personal advancement 
over rival scientists, educators, workers, professional men, business man- 
agers, government administrators, soldiers, and police. 
Governmentalization carries with it the centering of decision-making in 
Washington and the relative decline of state and metropolitan govern- 
ment. As the fiscal reins are gathered in national hands, the grant-in-aid 
and the direct allocation of material become major means of subordinating 
local plans to central purposes. Local affairs are seen in the perspective of 
the entire American security zone, which brings in Canada, Central and 
South America, and whatever spheres in Europe, Africa, Asia, and the 
islands of the Pacific are part of the America-centered garrison. Bases 
are ringed around the globe for the double purpose of surveillance and 
retaliation; and facilities are decentralized according to a centrally deter- 
mined program for reducing the vulnerability of static targets. 
Regimentation is a concomitant of the governmentalizing process (using 
the term to refer to the invasion of former zones of privacy by govern- 
ment). Not only are organized private activities dominated by govern- 
ment; private life is encroached upon by police surveillance, by the draft- 
ing of men for military service, by the restricting of free movement in the 
interest of security (for the enlarging list of military reservations). 
Democracy also declines, especially as enlightenment dwindles away. 
In the name of security, less and less information is allowed to pass 
through the mass media of communication to the public for comment, 
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discussion, petition, pressure group formation, or party action. At first 
the owners and managers of the media institute a "voluntary censorship," 
a censorship made more palatable by the bribe of "inside information" 
received on the understanding that it is not to be disseminated further 
"for security reasons." Public forums become devoid of informed content, 
save for local matters. Criticism, growing less informed, more parochial, 
less unified, and more suspect for "unpatriotic" content, declines in 
prestige and power. 
Alongside these transformations occurs the rise of the soldier-policeman 
at the expense of the civilian skill groups. The governmentalizing process 
carries with it the decline of groups whose power depends upon free mar- 
kets, free forums, free pressure, and party activity. The businessman be- 
comes a contractor and subcontractor of government dependent upon 
administrative decisions, rather than free bargaining to obtain materials, 
labor, transportation, designs, location, credit, and most of the other items 
for which the free enterpriser takes responsibility. Party propagandists 
and administrators decline as the party system loses effectiveness. The 
propagandists and the owner-administrators of pressure groups or mass 
media of communication also drop off in influence. 
Initially the one who benefits from the shift from private to government 
activity is the civilian administrator. But civilian authority and control 
are steadily whittled away by the soldier-policeman, whose distinctive 
nuclear skill is violence, not propaganda, bargaining, or civil administra- 
tion. When the strategic dimensions of every public expenditure loom, the 
soldier is turned to for advice, and the policeman for loyalty information. 
Consulted more often, the soldier-policeman participates more fully in top 
level decisions. Having a more and more complete monopoly of "security" 
information, these elements improve their power position by withholding 
knowledge from civilian administrators, and from Congress, the parties, 
pressure groups, and owner-editors of mass media. Civilian control blacks 
out gradually as the beams of intelligence grow dim, first for the public at 
large, and eventually for the civilians who are nominally in power. As the 
community becomes more apprehensive of the dependability of its officials 
and of the neighbors, the results of police espionage are permitted to weigh 
in the evaluation of loyalty, even when such results are incompletely dis- 
closed. Traditional means of protecting the privacy of individuals against 
official encroachment are gradually rendered inoperative. The political 
police become more important, rivaling the soldier for the top role in the 
affairs of the garrison state. 
Personnel is more frequently recruited from soldier-police elements, 
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eventually creating a self-perpetuating bureaucracy which relies upon" de- 
pendable elements" from the families and satellites of the soldier-police 
bureaucrats themselves. 
Since the changes envisaged in this sketch are not expected to come all 
at once (or even to be carried to their "logical," i.e., "thinkable" conclu- 
sion), they are spread over several years, which enables the deep-seated 
objections springing from American tradition to be overcome piecemeal. 
It is conceivable that modern skills of management will be applied, with 
much success, to the task of reducing the dislocations incidental to the 
transformations here outlined. Seeing the seriousness of the " fifth column" 
danger from disaffection within the community, continuous efforts will 
be made to remove the discriminations which are a permanent source of 
insult to the self-esteem of ethnic groups within the United States. In the 
United States security zone, the obvious advantage of receiving mass 
support will bring about continual effort to improve the position of the 
masses. 
IN THE U.SS.S.R. 
The Soviet Union, in the meanwhile, has adjusted to the second and 
third periods with far less sweeping changes than the United States, since 
governmentalization has prevailed in the U.S.S.R. for many years. Regi- 
mentation, centralization, and despotism are not new; and the institutions 
of the free market, free forum, and free party system have never struck 
firm root. 
None the less, the political picture in the Soviet Union will not be 
entirely static. Civilian control, for example, is a basic principle of Soviet 
policy, and the party has successfully fought to maintain the ascendancy 
of the party over the state, including all such skill specialists as soldiers 
and police, and such organs as the army and the police services. The police 
have achieved their present and prospective eminence in the struggle of 
the party elite against rival cradles of power, notably the Red Army. 
Mastery of Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist dogma is one instrument of the 
party in the inner battle for control; and we can foresee the continuation 
of the struggle to bring about the selection and promotion of officers and 
administrators who demonstrate their doctrinal competence and discipline 
to the satisfaction of the party. At the same time the primacy of the party 
is undermined by tendencies which, unless kept in perpetual check, will 
overthrow it. Specialists on military matters typically are so devoted to 
the preparation and rehearsal of war plans that they resent the time " lost" 
on refresher courses on party dogma; and they resent the attempt of party 
police, and other party organs, to maintain effective control over the 
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decision-making spots in the Red Army. Many other specialists, absorbed 
in fascinating and responsible tasks, resent the doctrinaires and propa- 
gandists. Scientists, engineers, and other production men belong to the 
" annoyed," tending to reject highflown phrases as cant, and the cantors as 
windbags. 
The effect of these and related factors is to bring about the "dilution" 
of doctrinal fanaticism among party recruits. Members are taken in, less 
for doctrinal purity and agitational ability, than for reasons of family se- 
curity, personal congeniality, and individual ability. The central leader- 
ship is subject to chronic danger from "grass roots" leaders who develop 
what we may call proto-constituencies inside and outside the party 
cadres. These proto-constituencies develop as spokesmen rise to cham- 
pion the claim to a better deal for this or that collective farm, industrial, 
professional, trade union, or local element in the population. There is a 
steady undertow of unacknowledged pressure from individuals and small 
groups who want "more now" rather than in the distant future, and who 
therefore are in favor of larger expenditures on diet, more commodious 
houses, larger rest homes, longer vacations, improved medical care, and 
other "real income" items. The argument takes the form of justifying 
claims for higher nominal and real wages to be paid to those who do the 
dangerous or the vital jobs, or who "sacrifice" by spending long years at 
school. Totalitarian states, of course, are experienced in the use of admin- 
istrative devices which are designed to prevent the growth of subleaders 
with tacit (or what we have called proto-) constituencies. Officials are 
switched here and there in order to forestall the formation of local ties, 
and to keep the individual totally dependent upon the central administra- 
tion. Occasionally, however, cleavages reach within the inner circles of the 
party elite, precipitating acute crises which have thus far ended with the 
defeat (and even the liquidation or suicide) of top spokesmen for the 
peasants, trade unions, or other components of Soviet society. 
As a means of counteracting incipient trends toward de-governmen- 
talization, decentralization, and democracy, many tactics are at the dis- 
posal of the top leadership. Among the available maneuvers the most 
dramatic instrument is the party purge, which is a drastic review and ex- 
pulsion of "undesirable" elements. Actually the purge is one of the cyclical 
movements which is distinctive of the mass party dictatorship: It is a 
means by which a threatened pattern of power (a threatened equilibrium) 
is restored. Michels christened the purge-dilution-purge cycle the "accor- 
dion rhythm" of mass party dictatorships.5 Through the cumulation of 
s Michels, Sozialismus und Fascismus in Italien (1925); Michels, Italien von Heute (I930). 
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private incentives the party membership expands, diluting the ideological 
intensity of the organization; startled by incidents which reveal the dan- 
ger of losing or sharing power, the central elite suddenly presses the party 
together. (Michels does not develop his metaphor to the point of speci- 
fying the nature of the sounds which are emitted at each phase of the 
cycle; given the prevailing ideological pattern, even this can be done.) 
We have postulated that the Soviet Union will grow stronger as the 
years pass (measured in terms of numbers, industrialization, modern 
weapon parity), and the living standard can slowly be allowed to rise, 
despite the outlay for armament. The purge will become less necessary as 
the deprivations to which the community is subjected become less severe. 
ESTIMATING PROBABILITY 
The preceding pages have outlined a hypothetical course of events in 
future world politics in which war is avoided, and global cooperation is 
eventually restored and extended. What is the likelihood that global de- 
velopments will follow this pattern? 
In evaluating the "construct" we need to consider the analyses and 
findings of the psychological and social sciences. Phrasing the matter in 
the most general way, we can say that effective cooperation is a variable 
in the social equilibrium of the world community which depends upon 
(and in turn acts upon) other variables, especially upon the expectation 
that policies of cooperation will yield a higher net return than non-cooper- 
ation. Net return is appraised in reference to such values as deference, in- 
come, and safety (two important deference values are power and respect).6 
Values are sought for the benefit of the self, which includes, besides the 
primary ego, all persons who are given the same treatment as the ego 
(e.g., family, neighbors, class, nation, party). The developmental picture 
portrays a world equilibrium in which the structure of expectation and 
demand remains sufficiently strong to sustain the demand to cooperate in 
competition with the demand to break off cooperation and resort to war. 
Furthermore, it is postulated that the equilibrium is maintained although 
the process works itself out through certain institutional features, some of 
which exist during all periods, others during some periods. Bipolarity, for 
example, is postulated throughout. Bipolarization, which is transition to 
a crystallized bipolar pattern, is said to be completed during the second 
period. The concentration of power inside each state involves the con- 
tinuous denial of freedom in Russia, and the curtailment of freedom else- 
6 Concerning values, see Lasswell and McDougal, Legal Education and Public Policy: 
Professional Training in the Public Interest, 52 Yale L. J. 203 (I943). Reprinted in Lasswell, 
The Analysis of Political Behaviour; An Empirical Approach, in The International Library 
of Sociology (Mannheim ed., I948). 
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where It is postulated that ideological differences diminish as the turning 
point is approached. Are there rational grounds for holding that it is 
possible to accept these institutional postulates, and also to give credence 
to the possibility of avoiding war? We examine each constitutional feature 
in turn in order to estimate the present state of knowledge concerning its 
relation to cooperation or war. 
BIPOLARITY AND THE GENERAL THEORY OF BALANCE 
Bipolarity is one of the several patterns occurring in political arenas, 
where it can be compared with unipolarity, pluripolarity, and multi- 
polarity. The unipolar pattern is found in situations in which one state 
attains overwhelming dominance, whether the state is "universal" or not. 
When the pattern is pluripolar, a few states dominate. Multipolarity oc- 
curs when only small states exist.7 
When we talk of a bipolar structure of global power, we are referring to 
the globe as a military, not a civic arena. Since power is a decision-making 
process, the form of the process is conditioned by the expectations which 
prevail about the manner in which decisions are made. When the expecta- 
tion is that decisions will be imposed by force, we speak of a military 
arena. A civic arena, on the other hand, is characterized by the expecta- 
tion that decisions will be registered peacefully and with little thought of 
the need of relying on force to back them up. Putting the distinction more 
generally, a political arena is civic when the expectation of violence is low, 
and military when the expectation is high. The eventual aim of pacific co- 
operation is to transform the world community, which is now structured 
as a military arena, into a civic arena in which power-balancing can pro- 
ceed with an eye on votes, rather than war and revolution. 
Perhaps it is worth reminding ourselves that the expectation of violence, 
and the resulting military arena, does not imply war at regularly recurring 
intervals. The history of warfare, if it shows the near-universality of war 
as a social institution, shows with equal conclusiveness that wars do not 
recur "on the hour." Many countries have gone many years without com- 
ing to blows (the United States and France). Efforts to discover and dem- 
onstrate the existence of a "twenty-year" (or any other) rhythm in war- 
fare have not been successful (although a factor in war crises can be the 
coming of age of a new generation after a devastating war). There is noth- 
ing about the history of the balance of power, bipolar or not, that enables 
us to predict with confidence the recurrence of war at regular intervals.8 
An outstanding characteristic of bipolarity is that freedom of recom- 
7 On the polarities consult Fox, The Super-Powers (I944). 
8 The standard summaries of research on war are Wright, A Study of War (I942); Sorokin, 
Fluctuations of Social Relationships, War, and Revolution 352-60 (i937). 
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bination is reduced to the vanishing point. Only when the diplomatic 
alignment is in transition toward bipolarity does a degree of freedom pre- 
vail among intermediate powers, and a state like Czechoslovakia teeters 
precariously on the rim of one power zone before falling one way or the 
other. Freedom of recombination is at a maximum in multipolar systems, 
as in India or Europe during periods when no great consolidations of power 
have lifted themselves above the ruck of tribes and principalities. Less 
wide than in multipolar arenas, freedom of recombination remains never- 
theless a significant feature of pluripolar systems, since it is taken for 
granted that at least two diplomatic alignments of about equal attrac- 
tiveness are open to each participant. Situated between Russia and West- 
ern Europe, Germany has for years veered first one way and then the other. 
The General Staff, the diplomatic corps, the publicists and other politi- 
cally alert elements were usually split between advocates of an orientation 
East or West. The possibility of a quick shift does not disappear on the 
coming of war: Witness the swift recombination of Russia and Germany 
in World War II, and the stubborn hope of Nazi leaders that they would 
succeed in driving a wedge between Russia and the West. Before 1914 
Italy played with the German-Austro-Hungarian bloc until the outbreak 
of hostilities, and eventually gravitated into the opposing camp; in World 
War II the orbit of Italy was also eccentric.9 
In evaluating the future the key question is: Can we regard it as estab- 
lished that the probability of war varies inversely with the flexibility of 
political recombination, and therefore is least when the pattern is multi- 
polar and greatest under bipolar conditions? There is serious support for 
an affirmative answer: "The probability of war will decrease in proportion 
as the number of states in the system increases."'" 
Recall, however, that before the rise of national states from the atomism 
of feudal Europe, the continent was in perpetual turmoil. The wars were 
"little wars," often referred to by historians as "raids" or "skirmishes." 
When we take into account the modest size of the population, and the in- 
completeness of the chronicles (full of violence as they are), we can doubt 
whether the arena as a whole provided a safe haven for life and limb. 
When the political structure of Europe became pluripolar, some of the 
bloodiest wars in history occurred (even though the frequency of resort 
to war appears to have declined). The evidence concerning bipolar systems 
9 On the diplomatic history of modern times see Bemis, A Diplomatic History of the United 
States (rev. ed., 1942); Langer, European Alliances and Alignments, I87I-I890 (I931); 
Langer, Diplomacy of Imperialism, I890-I902 (I935); Bourgeois, Manuel historique de 
politique etrangere (1922-26). 
10 2 Wright, op. cit. supra note 8, at 755. 
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is very unsatisfactory, partly from paucity of instances, and partly from 
insufficient or inadequately classified data. The main defect in classifica- 
tion is failure to distinguish between formal and effective power (between 
"authority" and "control"). Thus it is customary among historians of 
China to treat certain periods as examples of a universal (or unipolar) 
state pattern. Yet there is evidence that during some of these periods, 
effective power followed a different pattern, which was often bipolar, 
pivoting around a Northern and Southern center." 
In the light of the considerations just referred to, it is reasonable to 
amend the proposition stated above as follows: The frequency of war 
varies directly, and the size of war varies inversely, with the number of 
states in the balancing process. 
Actually there is some foundation for the view that when bipolar sys- 
tems are approximately equal in strength, they are stable. Our hypotheti- 
cal model underlines the expectation of "weapon parity," meaning that 
the elites of the Russo-American world accept the likelihood that each 
could do severe damage to the other in the eventuality of war. "Stability 
will increase," according to Quincy Wright, "as the parity in the power of 
states increases."12 This proposition implies that stability in a bipolar 
parity system may be greater than when other systems lack parity (both 
pluri- and multipolar arenas can have many unmatched units). 
On the basis of existing analysis and knowledge, we conclude that very 
little can be definitively said about bipolarity in a balancing system; we 
can at least doubt any extreme statements about the "inherent" impact 
of bipolarity on war. 
BIPOLARIZATION: THE PERILS OF TRANSITION 
Since a firm structure of bipolarity does not come into being on the 
instant, but in the course of a long period of rival moves and counter- 
moves, it is important to recognize that our picture of the future em- 
braces an early phase of transition, and that years of transition offer many 
1I For a criticism of Arnold Toynbee's material in A Study of History, see Lasswell, op. cit. 
supra note 4, at 891. 
1 2 Wright, op. cit. supra note io, at 755. Note that world politics can be repluralized 
under certain conditions of parity. If all powers (small, middle, and large) can accumulate 
enough destructive equipment to make almost certain the annihilation of an enemy, war will 
be relinquished as an instrument of policy (except for paranoid psychotics, who may be in a 
power position, and for whom destruction is a supreme value). This is a matter of inventing 
armament which can be obtained at sufficiently low cost to come within the means of every 
state. Under such conditions resources will probably be diverted from the making of super- 
fluous arms to other activities; and such activities may involve cooperation across state lines. 
See the remarks of Jacob Viner, The Implications of the Atomic Bomb for International 
Relations, go Proc. Am. Phil. Soc. 56 (I946). 
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perils to friendly intercourse. The emergence of bipolarity is no mere 
cyclical recurrence, but rather a structural change leading to a new pat- 
tern of equilibrium. 
That times of transition are "times of trouble" is a commonplace of 
human experience and historical wisdom, and the scientific analysis of 
human behavior reveals many variables which account for these difficul- 
ties. Stability of response depends chiefly on stability in the structure of 
expectation, which is deeply, though not wholly, determined by the degree 
of stability in the environment. When the environment presents new and 
hence unanticipated problems, the adjustive capacity of the organism 
(individual or group) is taxed.'3 There is not only intellectual uncertainty 
about the outcome of future developments. There are unconscious anxie- 
ties generated in a condition of uncertainty, which confer cumulative in- 
tensity upon the response. In global politics whenever diplomatic, mili- 
tary, and other officials meet new configurations, the probability is en- 
hanced that estimates of reality (estimates of the other fellow's conduct) 
will be seriously skewed. When all parties are unsure of themselves the 
environment is peculiarly difficult to appraise, since each provides an 
erratic environment for the other. Local and central officials find it dif- 
ficult to judge how far to go without bringing about the war that nearly 
everyone may fear and wish to postpone or dispense with entirely. Diplo- 
matic history is dotted with examples of bad judgment on the part of 
responsible officials acting under stress of surprise in a fog of doubt about 
the meaning of current developments.14 At such times the channels of in- 
telligence are characteristically blacked out or fogged by contradictory 
assertions; and the rumor-ridden environment puts the heaviest imagin- 
able burden on judgment. Deliberate instigators of crisis are in a favorable 
position to throw gasoline on the blaze. Hence until it is clear where the 
boundaries lie between the Russian and American zmnes, local frictions 
can blaze into general conflagration. 
A stabilizing factor during this difficult time of transition is the extreme 
centralization of Soviet power. On the one hand, the continual testing of 
the countries around the Soviet zone proceeds in the hope of discerning 
13 Note the frequency of errors when individuals confront an environment where new 
responses must be learned. Consult Hilgard and Marquis, Conditioning and Learning (I940); 
McGeoch, The Psychology of Human Learning (1942). 
'4 The Crimean War has often been called one of the "most avoidable" wars in history. 
Britain was involved at the very beginning in the Russo-Turkish quarrel when Colonel Rose, 
the British charge d'affaires, hearing of Russia's demands from the panic-stricken Grand 
Vizier had to act on his own initiative and made the mistake of sending an urgent summons to 
the British fleet to come from Malta to Vourla. The Crimean War is covered in 2 The Cambridge 
History of British Foreign Policy (1922-23). 
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the "soft" spots, and keeps the world in turmoil. On the other hand, local 
agents are notoriously devoid of personal initiative, holding themselves in 
apprehensive subordination to the all-decisive center. So long as the top 
Russian elite regard themselves as being too weak to engage in all-out 
global war, subordination of the periphery to the center is a stabilizing 
influence. 
An unstabilizing factor is the calculation of preventive war by the party 
that looks upon itself as suffering relative decline. Should not the U.S. 
put a stop to Russian plans and acts of aggression before the modern 
weapons of warfare are developed to a degree that forbids such an enter- 
prise? The following considerations operate to check the preventive war 
venture: 
From a strategic standpoint such a war would be no "thirty-minute" 
campaign. Enemy territory would need to be occupied as a follow-up on 
the bombing of enemy targets. The military forces of America and the 
allies of America would occupy all Siberia and all European Russia. It 
would not be possible, however, to annihilate the enemy's army without 
doing irreparable damage to civilians in friendly countries since the Red 
Army, deprived of bases in Russia, can overrun cities in Western Europe 
which we would be loath to destroy. 
At the end of active hostilities, the length of occupation would depend 
upon the policies to be put into effect. A relatively short period would suf- 
fice if our aim were to install machinery for the international control of 
nuclear energy. But during the war period, some American leaders would 
undoubtedly go beyond this limited objective and insist upon dismember- 
ing the U.S.S.R. and restoring private capitalism (at least of international 
privately owned monopolies of mines, utilities, and heavy industry). Such 
a program would be vehemently attacked by many other American 
leaders, who would assert that any attempt to disinter capitalism would 
transform the globe into a vast revolutionary-counter-revolutionary arena 
(in which America leads reaction). They would argue that any tendency 
to convert a "preventive" war into a "reactionary" crusade would boom- 
erang, widening the split in American morale already stimulated by the 
war itself. 
It is uncertain which trend of policy would win, but the champions of 
minimum intervention would undoubtedly be handicapped by the anti- 
communist, anti-Russian, anti-socialist ideology prevalent during the 
war, and by repressive measures put into effect by military and police 
authorities. Also, the conquest of Russia would not necessarily guarantee 
American security. There would be perpetual rumors of anti-American 
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conspiracies and of new, deadly, and compact secret weapons. Our au- 
thorities would not only search for signs of subversive activity throughout 
Russia; they would view every nation with suspicion, wondering whether 
Mexico City, Madrid, or Buenos Aires harbored conspirative cells and 
secret laboratories devising new tools of death. Our leaders would be 
tempted to wage another, and yet another, "preventive" war in order to 
enlarge the area policed from Washington. 
The shock of the first "preventive" war (the one against Russia) would 
have opened great cleavages among the American people, where there are 
many persons for whom the Soviet Union is the beacon light of humanity. 
The admirers of Russia are by no means exclusively recruited from racial 
and other "second-class" citizens of the United States. In war genuine 
seditionists would shock the ruling elements of America into defensive 
repression, tending to transform the United States (and all dependent 
countries) into a garrison-prison state. Each successive war of "preven- 
tion" and each successive intimidation of a "doubtful" state would alien- 
ate a new group of Americans. Since the dissenters would be distributed 
widely throughout the nation, the ruling groups would generate inner 
tension and conflict.'I 
In conclusion, our analysis of the period of transition underlines the 
precariousness of the peace while the bipolar pattern is becoming crystal- 
lized. 
THE DENIAL AND CURTAILMENT OF FREEDOM 
We have postulated that the social structure of the two garrison camps 
moves in zig-zag fashion toward a common pattern, which implies that 
the present denial of freedom in Russia will continue, while the progressive 
curtailment of freedom will occur in the American zone. Our hypothetical 
picture does not assume that American institutions succumb to totali- 
tarian regimentation and despotism in a day or a decade; or, indeed, that 
the process is ever completed. And we do not lose sight of the probability 
that, as the America-centered zone enlarges, the area of freedom may be 
substantially widened in states where native ruling groups are cajoled or 
coerced into adopting measures designed to consolidate the mass basis of 
government. 
American opinion is, in general, repelled by the thought of giving sup- 
port to obsolete thrones, self-indulgent ruling families, autocratic feudal 
landlords, and exploitative mine owners and industrialists. Whenever the 
question is raised of giving economic and military support to these 
is Lasswell, op. cit. supra note 4, at 899-goo. See further Baldwin, The Price of Power 
300-302 (1948). 
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decadent" and "reactionary" elites (for strategic reasons connected with 
oil or forward bases), support is subjected to a hail of criticism that re- 
duces the speed and even the volume of the assistance. Some despotisms 
which the United States has aided in the past (and will no doubt assist 
in the future) have rejected American advice to liberalize their institu- 
tions, thinking that it is necessary for the U.S. to support them anyhow. 
In other cases gestures have been made, such as the passing of laws pro- 
viding for a free press, free elections, and the free formation of political 
parties permitted to engage in propaganda. Such measures have not been 
accepted at face value by American officials in the past (nor will they be, 
in the future), but on the other hand they are not dismissed with con- 
tempt. Trained Americans are sufficiently aware of the history of con- 
stitutional and popular government in Great Britain, for instance, to 
recognize that documents (like the Magna Charta) wrested from one big 
landlord by several landlords can become the rallying symbol for further 
sharing of power. The prevailing official view is that our economic as- 
sistance, in addition to minimum military support, will provide for a ris- 
ing standard of living throughout our security zone, and eventually create 
social bases for freer institutions everywhere. 
Since frustration breeds protest, it requires no clairvoyance to foresee 
that the sacrifices entailed by a huge program of military defense, and the 
concomitant restriction of freedom, will result in chronic movements of 
protest. In the name of peace and of confidence in the basic good will of 
the common people of the world, leaders can rise who symbolize the 
pacifist trends of a business civilization. One effect of pacific agitation will 
be to weaken the United States, since the spectacle of pacifism and dis- 
unity affects the balance of power in many ways. One factor is that the 
Russian elite is schooled in that brand of dogmatic Marxism which treats 
pacifism as a sign of decadent social formations. Even without this par- 
ticular indoctrination, however, the ruling few in despotisms character- 
istically look upon public protest and discussion as evidence of disunity 
and hence of weakness. The underestimating of democracy is a recurring 
disease of autocracies and tyrannies: Recall that Germany succeeded in 
underestimating America twice in one generation, losing two world wars 
in consequence. The elites of Imperial and of Nazi Germany presumed 
too much upon vocal expressions of pacifism, isolationism, irresoluteness, 
and disunity. 
During the period before weapon parity is attained, war can come by 
inadvertence if the Russian elite miscalculates the amount of pressure to 
which the United States can be subjected on a given question. An element 
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in miscalculation would be the overestimating of the symptoms which we 
have been reviewing.'6 The overvaluation can lead the Russians "too far 
too fast" in the as yet undelimited zones between the United States and 
the Soviet Union. After weapon parity has been reached and the bounda- 
ries of the two-centered world have been stabilized, the threat to peace 
from unrealistic estimates of American democracy on the part of the 
Russian elite will continue. (We postulate that despite a decline in effec- 
tiveness, democratic institutions will long continue to possess vitality.) 
On the American side, we must not underrate the dangers arising from 
the tactics by which the American elite will seek to justify enormous mili- 
tary expenditures, and the steady curtailment of freedom. I speak of the 
war scare tactic, which consists in playing up international friction so that 
popular expectations of imminent war are at a high pitch. As the re- 
sponsible leaders of the United States cope with the task of transforming 
our society into a garrison state, they run afoul of the vested and senti- 
mental interests of a business society. One obvious means of gaining sup- 
port for military measures is to take advantage of tension-incidents which 
can be imputed to Russia. It is evident to everybody that without "the 
rape of Czechoslovakia" ERP would have had much tougher sledding. 
This war scare was not engineered by our government officials: The situa- 
tion spoke for itself to American newspaper and radio correspondents. 
However, there will be many occasions in which the temptation to pro- 
long a war scare will arise, quite apart from circumstances in which the 
party in office is trying to make itself solid in an election year.-7 
Inside autocracies and tyrannies the war scare is a stock device for 
maintaining acquiescence in a tight monopoly of power. We have pre- 
viously analyzed the purge cycle; and this analysis can be extended to 
show how the war scare tactic is often correlated with the purge. When 
thousands if not millions of members have been expelled from the "party," 
and a shiver of fear has run down the spine of the whole population, a 
drama of unification is needed.'8 A war scare turns the focus of attention 
I6 Concerning World War II consult Shulman, Defeat in the West (I948), based on German 
intelligence reports. It should be observed as a counterfactor that a centralized despotism can 
retreat from a dangerous situation more speedily than a democratic state. 
'7 On the influence of domestic political calculations on American foreign policy see Bailey, 
A Diplomatic History of the American People (3d ed., I946), which gives unusual weight to 
party politics and public opinion factors. 
18 It is a misnomer to call the monopoly "parties" of Communist, Nazi, and Fascist states 
by the term used where free elections are found. "Political order" is far more appropriate. We 
postulated that the Soviet elite will believe itself to be more secure at home as the standard of 
living is gradually improved, and that the technique of the war scare will become less essential. 
Nevertheless, the process can be long drawn out. See Lasswell, World Politics Faces Economics 
56 (I945). 
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from domestic apprehensions to a common foreign enemy, re-sentimen- 
talizes the symbols of cohesion within a community, enables the ruling 
group to act as a champion of the whole, and retroactively justifies the 
elite in keeping the reins of power tightly in hand. The war scare and the 
purge can be blended, as when the purged are denounced as agents of a 
foreign power seeking to undermine the community. The purge trial, 
when a treason trial, is the ultimate in synchronization of two political 
patterns. 
In general, the denial and curtailment of freedom, though a significant 
danger to peaceful evolution, is not likely to be a decisive factor in wreck- 
ing peace. 
CHRONIC CRISIS AND PERSONAL INSECURITIES 
We know that personal insecurities are evoked in crises, and that our 
hypothetical model of the future postulates high levels of expectation 
about the likelihood of war. True enough, tension will rise and fall, but it 
will not fall to the low water mark of many years past. We know enough 
about human behavior under crisis conditions to see that a recurring 
threat to the precarious balance between peace and war will be the desper- 
ation which is generated by the omnipresent spectre of war. Caroline 
Playne summarized a very original attempt to apply psychopathology to 
the understanding of pre-IgI4 politics in this way: 
In no nation did the mass of the people consciously desire war. On the contrary, 
they were everywhere desperately afraid of it. ... Nevertheless, depression deepened. 
... A policy of despair-a wild desire to solve difficulties, once for all, by force, sprang 
up and gained possession of men's minds. The insane idea of a "war to end war" was 
derived from the despondency and despair which demolished reason and turned 
away from rational methods.19 
Multitudes in all the European countries accepted the outbreak of war in 1914, 
multitudes welcomed it as a licensed break-up of detestable lives.2o 
L. P. Jacks put the matter in a nutshell when he wrote of the "peaceful- 
ness of being at war." 
Available knowledge of human response suggests, however, that we 
refrain from "going overboard" in estimating the factor of desperation. 
For the act of talking desperately is itself no inconsiderable catharsis of 
internal distress. Wild talk protects tame acts. Another element is the 
immunity of the false alarm, classically portrayed in the "wolf! wolf!" 
story. Persons protect themselves from feeling panicky, and making fools 
of themselves, by disbelieving headlines. 
I9 Playne, The Neuroses of the Nations 443 (1925). 
20 Playne, The Pre-War Mind in Britain: An Historic Review 29 (1928). 
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In addition, we know of the enormously wide range of means which are 
at the disposal of human beings for coping with inner stress. Not the least 
efficacious is diversion, which consists in shifting the focus of attention 
from the source of frustrating subjective states. Persons who are un- 
equipped to rely upon insight often impose upon themselves the compul- 
sive whiplash of incessant work. Or they take up hobbies: This covers 
thousands upon thousands of detailed activities, from "A for Alpine climb- 
ing" to "Z for zinnia raising." And there is always sexuality, conviviality, 
or drug addiction; and we need not overlook the many modes of physical 
incapacitation whose psychosomatic origin is attested by modern medi- 
cine. 
One of the commonest defenses against anxiety is the denial of danger, 
and the reactivation of tactics which were relied upon in early life for the 
obviating of insecurity. The denial of danger is nearly certain to provide a 
rallying point for protest movements against war. Affirming that "men 
want peace," the prescription is to "want" peace even harder. This magi- 
cal thinking can be sanctioned by invoking many heroic figures and 
authorities.2? 
Knowledge of the dynamisms of defense against anxiety does not supply 
us with all we need in predicting the impact of chronic crisis upon Ameri- 
cans. The degree of reliance upon each defense depends upon the basic 
patterns of the culture, position in the class structure, a sense of crisis, and 
the phase of personality development. At the moment we have the most 
rudimentary outlines of American character, of the interdependence of 
class and personality, of the impact of crisis, and of the detailed genesis of 
personality.22 
Perhaps we can sum up this consideration of chronic crisis and personal 
insecurities by saying that while there is ample corroboration of the 
seriousness of desperate reactions to anxiety and uncertainty, there is 
ample evidence of the great range of anxiety-reducing devices. Hence 
there is no foundation for sweeping statements about the inevitability of 
war as a function of social crisis. 
2I Concerning the range of defenses against anxiety, see Fenichel, The Psychoanalytic The- 
ory of Neurosis (I945); Freud, The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defense (1946); Jules H. 
Masserman, Behavior and Neurosis (1943); Dunbar, Emotions and Bodily Changes: A Sur- 
vey of Literature on Psychosomatic Interrelationships (2d ed., I938). 
" Sketches of American culture, or of the American character, are found in Lynd, Knowl- 
edge for What? (1939); Mead, And Keep Your Powder Dry (1942); Kluckhohn and Kluck- 
hohn, American Culture: Generalized Orientations and Class Patterns, in Conflicts of Power 
in Modem Culture (Seventh Symposium of the Conference on Science, Philosophy and Re- 
ligion in Their Relation to the Democratic Way of Life) o06-28 (I947); Gorer, The Americans 
(I948). In general, see the approaches of Lloyd Warner, John Dollard, Ruth Benedict, Ralph 
Linton, and Abram Kardiner. 
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THE REVISION OF IDEOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES 
Our speculative model of the future forecasts the weakening of the 
ideological differences between the America-centered and the Russia-cen- 
tered world, and the growth of a common outlook. Let us scrutinize this 
possibility in the light of what we know about the dynamics of ideology.23 
We note, in the first place, that ideologies often change, while seeming 
to remain the same. This is accomplished by retaining the doctrinal skele- 
ton intact, while modifying the details, and by changing the intensity of 
the emotional drives with which the skeleton is propelled into action. 
Of direct interest to us are the factors which have brought about the 
transformation of non-cooperative policies that were buttressed by ex- 
pectations of "inevitable" victory for one side. It is no novelty in human 
history for groups to believe in the inevitable victory of their cause and 
the discomfiture of their enemies. Nor is it novel to see that such claims 
have been accommodated to policies of peaceful cooperation with others 
by the gradual weakening of fanaticism and the progressive modification 
of doctrinal detail. 
Expectations of inevitability are shaken when predictions fail. This is 
the most significant general truth that emerges from the comparative 
study of the circumstances in which ideologies of inevitability have been 
undermined. When the date of victory is tomorrow afternoon, and to- 
morrow comes and goes without the fulfillment of prophecy, a new date 
line is necessary, this time perhaps a more ambiguous one until eventually 
the millennial moment vanishes into vagueness, and remains as a figure 
of speech in ceremony and poetry. In our construct it is postulated that 
the America-centered world will succeed in preventing severe crises of 
mass unemployment, and hence in contraposing to the Russian doctrine a 
state of facts that calls for postponing the "inevitable" collapse of capi- 
talism until well beyond tomorrow afternoon. 
If the America-centered world obstinately neglects to collapse, the ad- 
vantages of non-cooperation are fewer, and the burdens weigh more 
heavily. And these are the circumstances in which a change of line is to 
be expected. 
The de-emphasizing of differences is favored by similarities in the doc- 
trinal system, since these are convenient points of identification, especially 
when basic goal values are conceived in much the same way. It is worth 
remembering that there are great similarities in the doctrinal structure of 
Russia and America, when we take the words at face value. Both ideolo- 
23 Concerning ideology the writings of Karl Marx, Georges Sorel, Max Weber, Vilfredo 
Pareto, Gaetano Mosca, and Karl Mannheim have been influential. 
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gies are democratic: They proclaim the dignity of man and the realization 
of the free man's commonwealth as the measure of worth and the goal of 
history. In a deep sense of the term both are individualistic (although this 
expression is in bad repute in the official semantics of Marxism): They 
are in unison in rejecting caste societies and in favoring mobile societies 
(in which individual merit counts). Both are optimistic: Cobden and 
Marx were equally sanguine about the imminence of a better world. Both 
are activistic: They expect to get results by the deliberate molding of 
human institutions. 
The de-emphasizing of differences is favored by all other similarities of 
culture in addition to doctrine. And here the range of parallel experience 
is prodigious. Russia is in mid-stream of a vast process of industrializa- 
tion, which means that Western science and technology is moving toward 
universality, and that certain uniformities of experience are imposed upon 
the attention of Russians as well as Americans, and that certain similari- 
ties of attitude will result. The modern technoscientific complex carries 
with it a formidable network of intercorrelated skills. Each of the uni- 
versal skills begets a set of predispositions that favor universal identifica- 
tions along skill lines. Physicists, chemists, biologists, astronomers, mathe- 
maticians, engineers, factory workers, mine workers, transportation 
workers, office workers, agricultural technicians: These and hundreds, if 
not thousands, of coordinate and subskill groups having an inexhaustible 
reservoir of common experience. Besides the work skills are the recrea- 
tional skills, which can be numbered in the thousands.24 
In the light of the universalizing tendencies of skill mastery, it is little 
wonder that parochial elites who seek to retain power on a territorial basis, 
find themselves constrained to adopt severe measures in holding in check 
the globally integrative potentialities of skill. It is the tension between the 
skill society and the territorial society that generates the savage repres- 
sions of insecure parochial elites, seeking to insulate their people from 
communion with their neighbors.2s 
24 In his monumental review of the significance of the growing recognition throughout 
the capitalistic world of the "human problems of industrial civilization," Georges Friedmann 
detects the "penetration" of other systems: "To say that the worker becomes the subject 
of measures of rationalization recognizes at the same time, does it not, that he is no longer 
a wage earner?" Problemes humaines du machinisme industriel 344 (I946). To some extent 
the phenomenon is one of "penetration" of capitalism by socialism. At the same time it is 
direct response to the problem of obtaining production in a society with a distinctive division 
of labor and traditional doctrines asserting the dignity of man. The revolutionary pattern of 
an epoch works itself out partly by diffusion and partly by invention (and the inventions may 
be parallel adaptations if the same predispositions and environmental opportunities occur). 
25 Offsetting skill as a factor making for positive identifications must be put the influence 
of skill rivalry in taking advantage of whatever opportunities are perceived in a territorially 
circumscribed situation to gain a skill advantage. Skill identifications operate positively when 
the context supports expectations about the advantages of skill cooperation. 
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The perpetual threat of war is itself a potentially unifying experience, 
for it provides a common institutional enemy as well as a personalized 
group enemy. The common threat and common burden create a deep im- 
plicit bond which, under circumstances of loosening tension, contributes 
mightily to the recovery of neighborliness, much as old combat enemies 
take keen delight in discovering the parallels in their own experience of 
weapons and fronts and officers and women. And the heat of perpetual 
crisis burns out the structural differences among antagonists, since each 
is tied to the other whom he seeks to overcome or thwart. In the degree 
to which the garrison state achieves universality, other institutional varia- 
tions subside, until all that is left is the accident of geography that led 
babies to emerge from wombs in Asia rather than America.26 
Revisionism, then, is possible in the ideological structure of any coun- 
try, whether in the covert form of changing emotional intensities or the 
more overt form of doctrinal amendment. Within the traditional frame- 
work of socialism, for instance, there has been a century of struggle among 
the many interpreters of the methods and findings of Marx-Engels- 
Lenin.27 And the traditional framework is well adapted to recognize new 
facts, since a distinction can always be made between the method of 
dialectical materialism and the findings of a particular writer. If the 
method is freshly applied to a new body of historical facts, it is capable 
of yielding findings that supersede earlier results. Today (and in the im- 
mediate future) there is ample room for asserting that Marx and Marxists 
have underestimated the influence of material factors in the present phase 
of industrial development. In the writing and thought of a century ago, 
when scientific and technological change were indescribably slower 
26 Among the factors that contribute to global unity are comprehensive international or- 
ganizations. Such institutions, if preserved during the phase of non-cooperation, provide 
opportunities for the resumption of more fruitful contact later. If the opportunity is provided 
at recurring intervals, less intense incentives are necessary to increase the volume of coopera- 
tive association. Meanwhile propaganda on behalf of "world government" or "federal union" 
can serve both the power interests of the United States and the long-range interests of man- 
kind. From the standpoint of United States power, the America-centered world is provided 
with a set of universal goal symbols in the name of which support can be invited from all 
accessible peoples (and the Soviet Union can be shown up as the great obstacle to cooperation). 
Furthermore, draft proposals for atomic energy control, and for the constructive use of re- 
sources, cannot postpone and may do something to expedite the coming of cooperation. 
27 On the richly diversified history of socialism the standard treatise remains Beer, All- 
gemeine Geschichte des Sozialismus und der sozialen Kampfe, (1922-I5) The full flavor of 
the Kautsky-Leninist controversy comes out in Kautsky, Der Bolshewismus in der Sachgasse, 
tr. as Bolshevism at a Deadlock (I93I), and Bukharin, Karl Kautsky and Sowjet Russland, 
tr. from Russian (1925). See Borkenau, World Communism: A History of the Communist 
International (1939); Rosenberg, Democracy and Socialism (1939). Leites and de Sola Pool 
analyzed the response of the Communist International to frustrating conditions, and to its 
own changes of line, in studies published by the Division for the Experimental Study of 
War Communication at the Library of Congress (to be republished). 
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than today, the implications of nuclear fission and jet propulsion for war 
were not foreseen. Today it is literally and not metaphorically true that 
global war can annihilate humanity, or at the very least do devastation of 
an unparalleled order of magnitude for large populations. Hence the fore- 
cast that the triumph of the free man's commonwealth will be ushered in 
by war (as the "proletarian" state repels the "imperialist" attacker) 
appears much less likely now than in the past. 
However, it is uncertain that everyone will be annihilated in another 
war. Our physical scientists cannot give us conclusive assurances on this 
point. But even a continuing threat of war can bring about a reversal in 
the direction of history so that, instead of progressing from caste societies 
to mobile (free) societies, the new direction is from the degree of freedom 
already reached to the inauguration of new caste societies in the form of 
self-perpetuating soldier-police elites in a world of garrison-prison states. 
The ideologies of the nonsocialist world have been in a bruised and 
battered condition in recent times, since the apologists of capitalism have 
been unequal to the task of arriving at a consensus on the nature of the 
historical process in which they find themselves. The Cobden dream of 
evolutionary progress to world fraternity and democracy in one big mar- 
ket has been rudely interrupted. It has been interrupted by the fact of 
giant private monopoly and the fact of global war, neither of which were 
foreseen or explained. When ideas fail, men also fight; and one fighting 
reaction of a scared non-Russian world is accepting the hope that a pre- 
ventive war on Russia will put things back where they were thought to be 
on the evolutionary path of Cobden. But this overlooks the improbability 
that a preventive war will prevent anything but the peace that it destroys, 
since there is no credible ground for the view that our security position 
will be improved by "victory." (The most likely outcome, by far, is the 
liquidation of the businessman as a social type, and the consolidation of 
the garrison state.) 
Given the factual situation presented by recent accelerated develop- 
ments in science and technology, it is probable that the human mind will 
respond by adapting older ideologies to new emergencies. The issue is not 
socialism versus capitalism; it is far more serious than that. It is both 
socialism and capitalism versus the garrison-prison state (if not total, 
near-total annihilation of humanity). 
As usual, the same revolutionary processes are working themselves out 
among all peoples who are in contact with one another during a given 
historical period, even as the "bourgeois" revolution resulted in the trans- 
formation of surviving feudal society into something else throughout the 
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West. Such world revolutionary processes do not necessarily work them- 
selves out by bringing all peoples within the framework of a single state. 
Nor do revolutionary transformations necessarily universalize the pattern 
of the revolutionary center. Rather (the bourgeois revolution is a case in 
point) the revolutionary pattern of the historical epoch can spread every- 
where without bringing a unipolar state or conforming to the hopes and 
programs of the original center of revolution. The pattern of I789 was 
not the pattern of the bourgeois epoch as a whole; nor did the bourgeois 
revolution create One Big State. In the same way, the world revolutionary 
processes of our time may work out in a bipolar frame, even as they depart 
from the aspirations of I917. 
SUMMARY 
We began by outlining a hypothetical course of development in which 
world politics preserves the peace until an eventual turning point when 
ordinary contact is resumed and enlarged between two bipolar garrisons. 
It is postulated that the factors in the social equilibrium which sustain the 
demand for cooperation always remain sufficiently strong to prevent total 
non-cooperation and war; and that in the fourth period, such factors of 
expectation and identification add greatly to the effective demand for 
policies of cooperation. The likelihood that events will, in fact, follow this 
track has been evaluated in the light of present day knowledge of the fac- 
tors which affect some of the most conspicuous institutional features of 
the hypothetical picture. In particular, we examined bipolarity and the 
general theory of balance, the perils of transition to a bipolar pattern, the 
modes of adjusting to denials or curtailments of freedom, the factors 
affecting personal insecurity in times of crisis, and the factors that soften 
ideological differences. The result is to underline the precarious balance 
upon which at all times the peace depends. Among the factors making for 
cooperation which are to some extent within the control of policymakers 
and their advisors who seek democratic values is the recognition that war 
and chronic preparation for war can turn the course of history away from 
the path of progress toward freedom and back toward the restoration of 
caste-bound societies (if not the actual destruction of man). 
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